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ICEBERG, RIGHT AHEAD! 
A COMPENDIUM OF TITLE ISSUES IN NORTH DAKOTA 
BLAINE T. JOHNSON* 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the doctrine of after-acquired title, North 
Dakota’s Marketable Record Title Act, and the alienation of homestead: 
three areas of real property law that on the surface seem simple and easily 
applied, but below the surface are fraught with problems and unintended 
consequences.  Much like the iceberg, what appears on the surface may 
look relatively harmless, but what lurks underneath can have serious 
repercussions.  This analogy not only applies to the comparison between 
surface interests and mineral interests, but also to the difference between 
well-intended legislation and the resulting impacts that must then be 
addressed after a carefully researched analysis of the legislation’s effect on 
real property law.  This article addresses the history and development of 
each of the above-mentioned topics, discusses the current application of 
North Dakota real property law in conjunction with recent legislative 
changes, and finally suggests changes to the law.  More importantly, 
however, this article seeks to give practitioners well-reasoned advice for the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most of an iceberg’s volume lies beneath the water’s surface.  At first 
glance, the tip of the iceberg seems relatively harmless; however, it is what 
lies beneath the surface that can wreak havoc when unexpectedly 
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encountered.  The same is true of real estate law and, in particular, title 
examination.  This article will examine three common real estate principles: 
the doctrine of after-acquired title, North Dakota’s Marketable Record Title 
Act, and finally alienation of homestead.  To fully understand the basis and 
purposes of each principle, this article will first review the history and 
development of each.  It will then explore in detail those troubling aspects 
that lie beneath the surface of superficial, cursory examinations of each 
principle.  In addition, this article will probe recent changes in legislation 
that on the surface appear well meaning, yet upon further review seem to 
reach unintended consequences.  Regardless of whether such legislation is 
repealed, amended, or otherwise adopted for practice, this article seeks to 
give practitioners a better understanding of common real estate  
principles—both with regard to surface estates and to mineral interests. 
II. DOCTRINE OF AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE 
At first glance, the doctrine of after-acquired title seems to be a simple 
concept.  “If, at the time of a conveyance, a grantor does not own all or part 
of the interest that the grantor purports to convey, but the grantor later 
acquires the interest that was the subject of the earlier conveyance, the 
grantor may be estopped from denying the claim of the grantee to the  
after-acquired title.”1  The underlying premise of the doctrine of  
after-acquired title is that the grantee acquires exactly what was promised 
by the grantor.  This section will review the history of the doctrine of  
after-acquired title, the doctrine as applied to quitclaim deeds, the implied 
covenants of the word “grant” and its effect on the doctrine, and finally 
recent North Dakota case law and legislation. 
A. HISTORY 
Derived from the California Civil Code,2 the codification of the after-
acquired title doctrine in North Dakota first appears pre-statehood.3  
“Where a person purports by proper instrument to grant real property in fee 
simple, and subsequently acquires any title or claim of title thereto, the 
 
1.  JOYCE PALOMAR, 1 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 219 (3d ed. 2014). 
2.  CAL. CIV. CODE §1106 (West 1872). 
3. GEORGE H. HAND, THE REVISED CODES OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA 1877:  
COMPRISING THE CODES AND GENERAL STATUTES PASSED AT THE TWELFTH SESSION OF 
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, AND ALL OTHER GENERAL LAWS REMAINING IN FORCE 335 (1877).  
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same passes by operation of law to the grantee, or his successors.”4  This 
codification is based upon a substantial body of longstanding case law.5  
The doctrine of after-acquired title has been explained as follows: 
The deed, which the grantor engages to warrant and defend, is a 
solemn stipulation that the grantor has the title which he is now 
about to transfer to the grantee as a purchaser for value.  In the 
face of this he cannot be heard to say, after making the transfer, 
that he had not that title at the time.  So his new title lies lifeless in 
his hands against such purchaser; the estoppels being a true 
conveyance.6 
The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
“The doctrine is founded, when properly applied, upon the 
highest principles of morality, and recommends itself to the 
common sense and justice of every one . . .  It is a doctrine, 
therefore, when properly understood and applied, that 
concludes the truth in order to prevent fraud and falsehood, 
and imposes silence on a party only when in conscience and 
honesty he should not be allowed to speak.”7 
“It is just that a party should not be permitted to hold or recover an 
estate in violation of his own covenant; and it is wise policy to repress 
litigation and to prevent a circuity of actions.”8 
B. QUITCLAIM DEEDS AND THE DOCTRINE OF  
 AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE 
Historically, a quitclaim deed was merely a release of any interest the 
grantor may have had in the property and did not rise to the level of a 
conveyance.9  From a grantee’s perspective, the quitclaim deed is the least 
 
4.  Id.  See also NORTH DAKOTA REVISED CODE § 47-1015 (1943) (hereinafter N.D.R.C.); 
N.D.R.C. § 5529 (1913); N.D.R.C. § 4984 (1905); N.D.R.C. § 3547 (1899); N.D.R.C. § 3547 
(1895). 
5.  See Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 130 (1889) (citing Irvine v. Irvine, 76 U.S. 617, 
625 (1869)). 
6.  See RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK R. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 927 n.4 
(1989). 
7.  VanRensselaer v. Kearney, 52 U.S. 297, 326 (1850). 
8.  Comstock v. Smith, 13 Mass. (1 Pick.) 116, 119 (Mass. 1832).  If a grantor were allowed 
to recover property against his grantee, the grantee would be entitled to an action against the 
grantor to recover the value of the land.  Id. 
9.  See Carkuff v. Balmer, 2011 ND 60, ¶ 10, 795 N.W.2d 303, 306 (citing Schuman v. 
McLain, 61 P.2d 226, 227-28 (Okla. 1936)).   
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desirable form of conveyance because it includes no title covenants.10  “The 
grantee does not have recourse against the grantor even if he had no interest 
in the property.  Similarly, the grantee has no recourse if the title is 
encumbered by easements, mortgages, judgment liens, or any other 
property interests . . . .  This type of deed usually is used for more limited 
purposes, such as releasing a mortgage, transferring property intrafamily, or 
settling a boundary line dispute.”11  Absent fraudulent representations, the 
grantor of a quitclaim deed is not responsible for the goodness of the title 
beyond the covenants in his deed.12  “A deed of this character purports to 
convey, and is understood to convey, nothing more than the interest or 
estate of which the grantor is seized or possessed at the time; and does not 
operate to pass or bind an interest not then in existence.”13  After-acquired 
title will not, as a general rule, inure to the benefit of the grantee under a 
quitclaim deed.14 
North Dakota adopted this general rule in Alsterberg v. Bennet.15  In 
Alsterberg, the plaintiff alleged that oral promises made by the grantor of a 
quitclaim deed were enforceable for the recovery of monetary damages 
suffered by the plaintiff in order to satisfy encumbrances against the 
property conveyed.16  The North Dakota Supreme Court held that “[o]ne 
who accepts a quitclaim deed is, in the absence of fraud, mistake, or other 
ground for equitable relief, conclusively presumed to have agreed to take 
the title subject to all risks as to defects or [e]ncumbrances, relying on such 
protection only as the recording laws afford him.”17  “The absence of 
express or implied covenants in a deed is equivalent to an express 
declaration therein that the grantor assumes to convey only his right or 
interest, whatever it may be, and that he declines to bind himself to do 
more.”18 
What constitutes a quitclaim deed and whether or not the doctrine of 
after-acquired title applies, however, is not always so clear.  In Aure v. 
Mackoff, Aure owned land in fee simple in Section 19, Township 151 
North, Range 95 West, McKenzie County subject to a mortgage to the State 
 
10.  BARLOW BURKE, ANN M. BURKHART, & R. H. HELMHOLZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
PROPERTY LAW 540 (1999). 
11.  Id. 
12.  VanRensselaer, 52 U.S. at 322. 
13.  Id.   
14.  Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 888 (N.D. 1956). 
15.  106 N.W. 49 (N.D. 1905). 
16.  Id. at 50. 
17.  Id. at 51. 
18.  Id. 
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of North Dakota.19  Subsequently, Aure executed an assignment of royalty 
to W. R. Olson purporting to “sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over 
unto the said assignee, all of my right, title and interest in and to Ten per 
cent (10%) Royalty of all the oil and of all the gas produced and saved.”20  
The assignment of royalty provided that the assignor agreed to warrant and 
defend the title to the same.21  The State of North Dakota foreclosed its 
mortgage, included the royalty owners in the foreclosure proceeding, and 
acquired title to the property by sheriff’s deed dated August 28, 1941.22  A 
contract for deed was entered into between the State of North Dakota and 
Aures on February 17, 1942 for the purchase of the property.23  The 
contract for deed was satisfied and a quitclaim deed was issued by the State 
of North Dakota on October 3, 1955, reserving an undivided fifty percent of 
all oil, gas, or minerals.24 
The issue before the court was whether or not the doctrine of  
after-acquired title applied to the assignment of royalty to W. R. Olson.25  
The Court found that North Dakota Revised Code section 47-1015 was 
inapplicable because the assignment of royalty did not purport to grant real 
property in fee simple, only to “sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over 
unto the said assignee, all of my right, title and interest in and to Ten 
percent (10%) Royalty.”26  The court likened this to a quitclaim deed.27 
This is certainly a case in which poor drafting results in poor law.  It 
appears on the face of the assignment of royalty that the intent of such 
instrument was to convey to W. R. Olson an undivided ten percent royalty 
interest in the lands.  The granting clause contained no words of release or 
quitclaim.  The inclusion of the “all of my right, title and interest in and to” 
was simply superfluous in nature, and it therefore resulted in ambiguity.  
The designation of conveyance of a specific interest in all of the oil and all 
of the gas produced and saved together in the lands with words of warranty 
is much more indicative of a warranty deed in which after-acquired title 
would pass.  In some regards, the court acknowledged this in its argument 
by stating:  “The assignment conveyed to Olson the complete and entire 
estate in a ten percent royalty.  We therefore need not be concerned with the 
 
19.  93 N.W.2d 807, 809 (N.D. 1958). 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. at 810. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. at 810-11. 
27.  Id. at 811. 
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rule that an estate cannot be enlarged by general warranty.”28  A 
conveyance of a specific interest is substantially different from granting “all 
of the assignor’s right, title, and interest.”  The court recognized, however, 
that the conveyance of only the assignor’s right, title and interest was not 
necessarily determinative because the assignment of royalty also included 
words of warranty.29 
The Aure court then held that a true quitclaim deed containing warranty 
of title “estops the warrantor from asserting against the grantee or his 
assigns any after acquired title derived through any act or conveyance of the 
warrantor prior to the deed in question.”30  In support of its proposition, the 
court cited Bell v. Twilight, an 1853 case from the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court.31  Bell held a mortgage against property owned by 
Ebenezer Fitts.32  Bell then executed a quitclaim deed to Twilight in which 
he “released, sold, and quitclaimed” the “right, title, interest, estate, and 
demand” of Bell in the property together with words of limited warranty of 
title.33  Subsequently, Bell acquired a life estate interest in the property 
from Hannah Fitts.34  Twilight argued that the quitclaim deed was effective 
to convey after-acquired title because of the words of warranty.35  The Bell 
court deemed that the warranty was limited in nature to only title derived 
and claimed by, from, or under Bell.36  Because the life estate interest was 
acquired from other sources, it did not fall under the purview of the limited 
warranty.37  Bell never purported to convey more than he had at the time he 
executed the deed, and the limited warranty could not be read to be 
inconsistent with the grant.38  The court noted that “[i]f the doctrine of 
estoppel went as far as was claimed, a party owning a partial title in an 
estate could not, by a quitclaim deed, drawn in the most guarded and 
specific terms, convey that interest, without at the same time stopping 
himself forever from purchasing the residue of the estate, and setting it up 
against his grantee.”39 
 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id.  
31.  Id. (citing Bell v. Twilight, 26. N.H. 401 (N.H. 1853)). 
32.  Bell, 26 N.H. at 404. 
33.  Id. (covenanting “to warrant and defend the said granted premises against all claims or 
demands of any person claiming by, from, or under [him].”). 
34.  Id. at 405. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. at 407. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. at 410-11. 
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The Aure court further cited the Massachusetts case of Comstock v. 
Smith to support its position.40  The Comstock court, however, found that 
the covenants were restricted covenants and were coextensive with the grant 
or the release.41  As such, a limited warranty covenanting against “the 
lawful claims and demands of all persons claiming by or under him” did not 
vest after-acquired title in the grantee.42  The Comstock court went further 
and deemed that the application of the doctrine of after-acquired title to a 
restricted conveyance and covenant would be a manifest perversion of the 
principle upon which the doctrine is founded.43 
The Aure decision likely reached the correct result in passing  
after-acquired title to the successors of the assignee.  However, the court 
should not have deemed the assignment of royalty akin to a quitclaim deed.  
In attempting to justify its decision, the court left practitioners with no clear 
direction for drafting appropriate conveyances. 
C. THE MAGICAL WORD “GRANT” AND  
 AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE 
While a naked quitclaim deed offers no covenants of title, North 
Dakota Century Code section 47-19-10 has created implied covenants of 
warranty when the word “grant” is used in conveyances, including 
quitclaim deeds.  North Dakota adopted the statute from California Civil 
Code section 1113, enacted in 1872, and it reads as follows: 
From the use of the word “grant” in any conveyance by which an 
estate of inheritance or fee simple is to be passed, the following 
covenants, and none other, on the part of the grantor for the 
grantor and the grantor’s heirs and assigns, are implied unless 
retrained by express terms contained in such conveyance: 
1.  That previous to the time of the execution of such 
conveyance, the grantor has not conveyed the same 
estate, nor any right, title or interest therein, to any person 
other than the grantee; and 
 
40.  See Aure v. Mackoff, 93 N.W.2d 807, 811 (N.D. 1958) (citing Comstock, 30 Mass. (13 
Pick.) 116 (Mass. 1832)). 
41.  Comstock, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) at 120.  (The grantor “agrees to warrant the title granted 
or released, and nothing more.  That title only he undertook to assert and defend.  To extend the 
covenant further, would be to reject or do away the restrictive words of it, and to enlarge it to a 
general covenant of warranty, against the manifest intention of the parties.”). 
42.  Id. at 117. 
43.  Id. at 121. 
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2. That such estate, at the time of the execution of such 
conveyance, is free from encumbrances done, made, or 
suffered by the grantor, or any person claiming under the 
grantor.  Such covenants may be sued upon in the same 
manner as if they had been inserted expressly in the 
conveyance.44 
In applying North Dakota Century Code section 47-19-10, the use of 
the word “grant” in a conveyance implies limited or restricted covenants of 
title rather than a general warranty. 
An issue then arises when a deed purporting to convey all of the 
grantor’s right, title and interest includes the word “grant” or other 
covenants.  In Hanrick v. Patrick, the United States Supreme Court 
examined a grant deed conveying “one undivided half of all my right, title, 
and interest in and to the following described lands . . . .”45  The deed 
contained covenants that the grantor was: 
lawfully seized of an interest in fee-simple of the granted premises 
aforesaid; that they are free from all incumbrances [sic] by me 
incurred; and that I have good right to sell and convey the same as 
aforesaid, and that I will, and my heirs executors, and 
administrators shall, warrant and defend the same to the said 
grantee, and to his heirs and assigns, forever, against the lawful 
claims and demands of all persons.46 
The Supreme Court held: 
The covenant of warranty in the deed to Sargent, however, 
relates only to the premises granted, which the grantors agree 
to warrant and defend, and the premises granted are described 
as “one undivided half of all my right, title, and interest in and 
to the following described lands,” and cannot, therefore, 
operate as an estoppel preventing the grantors from asserting 
any subsequently acquired title . . .  There is no recital in the 
deed to estop her as to the character of her title or the quantum 
of interest intended to be conveyed within the rule laid down 
by this court in Van Rensseloer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297.  In 
the absence of such recital, a covenant of general warranty, 
where the estate granted is the present interest and title of the 
 
44.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-19 (2013). 
45.  Hanrick v. Patrick, 119 U.S. 156, 173 (1886). 
46.  Id. 
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grantor, does not operate as an estoppel to pass a subsequently 
acquired title . . .  Where the deed, although containing 
general covenants for title, does not on its face purport to 
convey an indefeasible estate, but only the right, title, and 
interest of the grantor, in cases where those covenants are held 
not to assure a perfect title, but to be limited and restrained by 
the estate conveyed, the doctrine of estoppel has been 
considered not to apply; in other words, although the 
covenants are, as a general rule, invested with the highest 
functions of an estoppel in passing, by mere operation of law, 
an after-acquired estate, yet they will lose that attribute when 
it appears that the grantor intended to convey no greater estate 
than he was possessed of.47 
The South Dakota Supreme Court examined a quitclaim deed in which 
the grantors “hereby convey, grant, remise, release, and quitclaim unto John 
L. Lockhart, trustee for the State of South Dakota, and to his assigns, 
forever, all the [their] right, title, estate, interest, property, and equity in and 
to the following real property.”48  South Dakota Codified Laws section  
43-25-10 concerning the implied covenants that are attached to the word 
“grant” is identical to North Dakota Century Code section 47-10-19.  In this 
case, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that the word “grant” in an 
instrument that only conveys the right, title, and interest of the grantor is not 
sufficient to convey after-acquired title.49  Following this decision, the 
South Dakota legislature codified the application of the after-acquired 
doctrine to the implied covenants attributed to the word “grant” so that 
“[e]very such instrument, duly executed, shall be a conveyance to the 
grantee, his heirs, and assigns, of all right, title, and interest of the grantor in 
the premises described, but shall not extend to after-acquired title, unless 
words expressing such intention be added.”50 
The California Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Dore.51  The deed in the Dore case contained the 
following grant clause: 
That the said parties of the first part do by these presents grant, 
bargain and sell unto the said party of the second part, and to its 
 
47.  Id. at 175-76.  
48.  State v. Kemmerer, 84 N.W. 771, 771 (S.D. 1900). 
49.  Id. at 773. 
50.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-25-8 (1911). 
51.  168 P. 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1917). 
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successors and assigns forever, all of their right, title and interest 
in and to the following tracts . . . .52 
California Civil Code section 1113 concerning the implied covenants 
that are attached to the word “grant” is identical to North Dakota Century 
Code section 47-10-19 and, as noted above, was the basis for the North 
Dakota statute.53  The California Court of Appeals refused to apply the 
implied covenants to a conveyance of only the grantor’s right, title, and 
interest, stating: 
According to the plain language of the statute it is only when a 
conveyance of an estate of inheritance or a fee simple is to pass 
that from the word “grant” a covenant is implied that the land to be 
conveyed is free from incumbrances; [sic] and when the 
conveyance by its terms merely purports—as does the conveyance 
here—to pass all the right, title, and interest of the grantors, 
according to the authorities nothing more passes than the estate 
which such grantors had in the land at that time subject to all 
defects and equities which could have been asserted against the 
grantors.  In Hull’s Adm’r v. Hull’s Heirs, 35 W.Va. 155, at page 
164, 13 S.E. 49, at page 52 (49Am.St.Rep.800), the court says: 
Where a deed conveys the grantor’s right, title and interest, 
though it contains in general terms a covenant of general 
warranty, the covenant is regarded as a restricted one, limited 
to the estate conveyed, and not one defending generally the 
land described.  The covenant of warranty is intended to 
defraud only what is conveyed, and cannot enlarge the estate 
conveyed.54 
Citing numerous other sources, the Dore court found that “it has been 
uniformly held that a conveyance of the right, title, and interest of the 
grantor vests in the purchaser only what the grantor himself could claim, 
and the covenants in such deed, if there were any, were limited to the estate 
described.”55 
 
52.  Id. at 147. 
53.  CAL. CIV.  CODE § 1113 (West 1917).   
54.  Dore, 168 P. at 147.  The Dore court went on to quote Gee v. Moore, stating “[t]he deed 
does not purport to convey the premises in fee simple absolute, so as to bring the instrument 
within the provision of the thirty-third section of our statute (section 1113) concerning 
conveyances.  It only purports to pass all the right, title, and estate, which the grantor possessed in 
the land.” Id. (quoting Gee v. Moore, 14 Cal. 472, 474 (1859)).   
55.  Id. (citing Brown v. Jackson, 16 U.S. 449 (1818); Coe v. Persons Unknown, 43 Me. 432 
(Me. 1857); Pike v. Galvin, 29 Me. 183 (Me. 1848); Sweet v. Brown, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 175 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court first touched upon the use of the 
word “grant” in a quitclaim deed in Frandson v. Casey.56  The quitclaim 
deed examined by the court included a granting clause that stated that the 
grantor “do[es] hereby convey and quit claim” to the grantee “all right, title 
and interest in and to” the described tract.57  The grantee argued that the 
quitclaim deed acted to convey all of the described property in fee simple 
and was not limited to only the one-third interest owned by the grantor.58  
No words of warranty were included in the quitclaim deed.59  The court, in 
dicta, noted that the quitclaim deed did not include the word “grant,” which 
implies certain covenants.60  Other than the possibility that the court 
included such dicta to signal a potentially different outcome had the word 
“grant” been included, nothing in the opinion reflects that the use of the 
word “grant” would have conveyed after-acquired title, and because the 
quitclaim deed had no covenants implied or otherwise, the issue was not 
properly before the court.61  Relying upon State v. Kemmerer, the court held 
that the quitclaim deed only conveys the interest of the grantor and does not 
purport to convey the property.62  Frandson, however, was not a case of 
after-acquired title, but one of determining what interest such quitclaim 
deed conveyed when no covenants were made.  The distinction is important 
because of the effect that this case caused on the interpretation of quitclaim 
deeds by practitioners. 
Prior to the Aure and Frandson decisions, North Dakota Title Standard 
1.071 stated as follows: 
The use of the word “grant” in a deed which releases and 
quitclaims all the grantor’s right, title and interest, or other words 
to that affect, does not make such a deed one by which an  
after-acquired title will pass.63 
In 1978, the North Dakota Title Standards Committee adopted a 
change of Title Standard 1.071 to remove the word “not” from the standard: 
 
(Mass. 1846); Allen v. Holton, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 458 (Mass. 1838); Adams v. Cuddy, 13 Pick. 
(Mass.) 460 (Mass. 1833); Blanchard v. Brooks, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 47 (Mass. 1831)). 
56.  73 N.W.2d 436 (N.D. 1955). 
57.  Id. at 447. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. (citing State v. Kemmerer, 84 N.W. 771 (S.D. 1900)).  
63.  N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1.017 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1961).   
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The use of the word “grant” in a deed which releases and 
quitclaims all the grantor’s right, title and interest, or other words 
to that affect, does make such a deed one by which an  
after-acquired title will pass.64 
The North Dakota Title Standards Committee cited Kemmerer as 
authority for the pre-1978 title standard.65  The North Dakota Title 
Standards Committee cited North Dakota Century Code sections 47-10-15 
and 47-10-19 as support of both versions of the standard.66  In 1988, the 
title standard was renumbered to North Dakota Title Standard 1-08 and 
authority cited as North Dakota Century Code sections 47-10-15 and  
47-10-19, 162 A.L.R. 556, and Aure v. Mackoff.67 
The American Law Report article cited as authority does not support 
the contention that the word “grant” will effectively pass title to  
after-acquired property when used in a quitclaim deed of all of the grantor’s 
right, title, and interest.  The article extensively cites cases that confirm that 
a generic quitclaim deed will only convey the interest of the grantor at the 
time of execution and that after-acquired title will only pass if words of 
general warranty are included.68  The majority rule expressed by the article 
is found in War Fork Land Co. v. Carr, holding that: 
The doctrine prevails that one who conveys, with a covenant of 
warranty, land to which he had not the title, but which he 
subsequently acquires by deed, devise, or descent, will be estopped 
to claim the land against his warrantee, to whom the title thereafter 
acquired inured by virtue of the conveyance and covenant of 
warranty . . .  But that doctrine does not operate to divest a title 
subsequently acquired when the deed of conveyance is without 
warranty, or is limited to a transfer of the interest owned by the 
grantor at the time of the conveyance.69 
The article goes on to further note: 
A grantor in a deed of the second class, not having assumed to 
convey an actual estate and to make it good against all claims 
but only to relinquish whatever estate he may have with a 
 
64.  N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1.017 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1978). 
65.  Id. (citing State v. Kemmerer, 84 N.W. 771 (S.D. 1900)). 
66.  N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1.017 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1978); N.D. TITLE STANDARDS 
§ 1.017 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1961).  
67.  N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1-08 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1988). 
68.  K. A. Drechsler, Annotation, Right or Interests Conveyed by a Quitclaim Deed, 162 
A.L.R. 556 (2015) (citing War Fork Land Co. v. Carr, 33 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1930)). 
69.  Id. 
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guaranty that he has not given anyone else any claim to it, is 
not bound to make any other title or estate good to grantee.  If 
at the time of his deed, he has suffered no one else to acquire 
any rights or claims under him, there can be no breach of his 
covenant.  After such a deed he is free to acquire other titles 
or estates in the same land, and hold them against his grantee, 
for he never covenanted against such titles or estates, but only 
against the title or estate he conveyed, whatever it was.70 
It appears that the North Dakota Title Standards Committee felt that the 
limited covenants expressed by the word “grant” were sufficient to meet the 
requirements of a deed of conveyance with warranty.  This position is 
arguably supported by Aure based upon the North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
decision to classify the assignment of royalty as a quitclaim deed with 
general warranty, and by Frandson, which included dicta suggesting the 
word “grant” may have altered the outcome of the Court’s holding.  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court dealt with this specific issue in the 2011 case 
of Carkuff v. Balmer.71 
D. CARKUFF AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION 
In 1953, Alice Carkuff conveyed all of the oil, gas, and other minerals 
underlying her property to her four daughters.72  On the same date, she 
conveyed by quitclaim deed the surface interest to her son, James Carkuff.73  
Four months later, on October 20, 1953, Alice Carkuff executed a quitclaim 
deed in which “Alice Carkuff ‘does by these presents GRANT, BARGAIN, 
SELL, REMISE, RELEASE and QUIT-CLAIM unto [James Carkuff] . . . 
all the right, title, and interest in and to’ the subject property.”74  The 
quitclaim deed did not contain a reservation of minerals and was not 
restricted to the surface only.75  Through a series of conveyances several 
years later, Alice Carkuff reacquired both the surface and the minerals and 
then again reconveyed the minerals to her daughters and the surface to her 
son.76  The heirs of James Carkuff argued that the October 20, 1953, 
 
70.  Id. (quoting Crockett v. Borgerson, 152 A. 407 (Me. 1930)). 
71.  2011 ND 60, 795 N.W.2d 303.  
72.  Id. ¶ 3, 795 N.W.2d at 304. 
73.  Id.   
74.  Id. ¶ 13, 795 N.W.2d at 308. 
75.  Id. ¶ 4, 795 N.W.2d at 305. 
76.  Id.   
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quitclaim deed operated to convey after-acquired title to the mineral 
interests because of the inclusion of the word “grant” in the conveyance.77 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reflected on 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds 
section 225, which provides: 
In determining whether a quitclaim has been created, operative 
words of grant or release are subordinated to words defining or 
restricting the interest granted.  When the entire instrument reveals 
an intention to convey the land itself or some definite interest 
therein, it is not a quitclaim merely because of the use of the word 
“quitclaim,” or the operative words “remise, release, and 
quitclaim,” unaccompanied by words of grant.  Nevertheless, such 
operative words used alone are significant factors; and where only 
the grantor’s right, title or interest is quitclaimed, such operative 
words are conclusive that the instrument is a quitclaim. 
Similarly, the intention of the parties so controls that the use of the 
term “grant” does not necessarily designate the character of a 
deed, but whether an instrument is a quitclaim deed or a deed of 
grant, bargain, and sale that purports to convey the property itself 
is to be determined from the whole of the granting clause 
contained in the deed.78 
In making its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court cited with 
favor the South Dakota decision of State v. Kemmerer.79  The court rejected 
the position that the word “grant” transforms the deed into one that would 
pass after-acquired title.80  Instead, the court held that while the term 
“grant” is used in the deed, it was limited to Alice Carkuff’s “right, title, 
and interest” in the property rather than specifically “grant[ing]” the entire 
fee to James Carkuff.81  In construing the quitclaim deed in such a manner, 
the court held that a quitclaim deed with limited covenants resulting from 
the use of the word “grant” does not operate to convey after-acquired title.82  
The court made no mention of the North Dakota Title Standards in its 
analysis because the parties never asserted that the deed was ambiguous.  At 
the time that the 1953 quitclaim deed was drafted and executed, North 
Dakota Title Standard 1.071 relied on State v. Kemmerer for the proposition 
 
77.  Id.   
78.  Id. ¶ 11, 795 N.W.2d at 307 (quoting 23 AM. JUR. 2D  Deeds § 225 (2002)). 
79.  Id. ¶ 13, 795 N.W.2d at 308 (citing State v. Kemmer, 84 N.W. 771, 772 (S.D. 1900)). 
80.  Id. ¶ 14. 
81.  Id.   
82.  Id.   
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that the word “grant” did not convey after-acquired title, further supporting 
the likely intent of the parties and confirming the decision of the court. 
The Carkuff decision was contrary to North Dakota Title Standard 
1.071 as amended in 1978.83  As a result, the North Dakota Title Standards 
Committee amended the standard to reflect the court’s holding:  “The use of 
the word “grant” in a quit claim deed does not, of itself, make the deed on 
which passes after-acquired title.  The deed on it’s [sic] face as a whole 
must be considered to determine the parties’ intent.84 
Practitioners’ reliance upon the title standard appears to be the basis for 
legislative amendments to North Dakota Century Code section 47-10-15 in 
2013 “correcting” the Supreme Court’s holding in Carkuff.85  The 
legislature passed Senate Bill 2168 in 2013 to amend North Dakota Century 
Code section 47-10-15 as follows: 
When a person purports by proper instrument to grant convey real 
property in fee simple and subsequently acquires any title or claim 
of title thereto to the real property, the same real property passes 
by operation of law to the grantee or the grantee’s successors 
person to whom the property was conveyed or that person’s 
successor.  A quitclaim deed that includes the word “grant” in the 
words of conveyance, regardless of the words used to describe the 
interest in the real property being conveyed by the grantor, passes 
after-acquired title.  The use of a quitclaim deed, with or without 
the inclusion of after-acquired title in the deed, does not create any 
defect in the title of a person that conveys real property.  This 
section applies to any conveyance regardless of when executed.86 
The amendment is contrary to well-reasoned case law and decades of 
practice—at least prior to 1978.  The authority for 1978 title standard was 
tenable, which Carkuff confirmed.  Admittedly, a simple bright-line rule for 
invoking the doctrine of after-acquired title is a good practice if it is in fact 
possible.  However, it is also good practice to rely upon the common 
understanding that a quitclaim deed conveys only the interest of the grantor, 
 
83.  N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1.071 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1978). 
84.  N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1-06 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 2012). 
85.  See Hearing on S.B. 2168 Before S. Judiciary Comm., 63rd Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2 
(N.D. 2013) (“The reason for this bill is that the Supreme Court has addressed a case recently that 
dealt with a quit claim deed, if the deed utilizes the language grant after acquired title will always 
pass.  If it does not have the grant language in it it will not pass after acquired title . . . it was 
decided to go with what the practice has always been and that is the use of the word grant 
whatever the document is would pass after acquired title.”).  The Committee Minutes also reflect 
the attempt to resolve issues of successive quitclaim deeds being recorded out of order.  See id. 
86.  2013 N.D. Laws ch. 346, § 1 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-15 (2013)). 
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whatever that may be, and nothing more.  Good drafting requires one to 
explicitly describe within the instrument the true intent of the parties.  
Rather than relying upon the word “grant” in a conveyance to invoke the 
after-acquired title doctrine and thereby implying covenants of warranty as 
well, it is far better to simply state: “This [insert name of instrument] 
conveys all after-acquired title of the [Grantor/Assignor].”  The inclusion of 
the word “grant” in a true quitclaim deed is unnecessary and may 
unintentionally transform the quitclaim deed into a limited warranty deed. 
It is noticeably unusual that, as codified, the application of the doctrine 
of after-acquired title when invoked by the word “grant” applies only to 
quitclaim deeds.  It should be noted that the Legislature did not change the 
definition of “grant” in North Dakota Century Code section 47-10-19; in 
other words, the limited covenants implied by the use of the word “grant” 
were not expanded.  However, as amended, there is now the potential for 
the word “grant” to take on different meanings depending upon the type of 
instrument in which it is used. 
In addition, the analysis of after-acquired title has always been founded 
upon the distinction of whether or not the instrument conveys a fee simple 
interest in the lands described or merely the interest of the grantor.  Because 
the first portion of North Dakota Century Code section 47-10-15 only 
passes after-acquired title when the instrument purports to convey real 
property in fee simple, the legislative amendments fail to take into account 
the situation in which an instrument conveys all of the grantor’s right, title, 
and interest in and to the lands described without using the word “grant,” 
but includes language of general warranty.  As such, it is possible that a 
warranty deed without the word “grant” and a quitclaim deed with the word 
“grant,” both conveying all of the grantor’s right, title and interest, would 
result in the warranty deed not conveying after-acquired title while the 
quitclaim deed conveys such title. 
This leads to the unanswered question of whether or not the use of the 
word “grant” in a mineral deed, assignment of royalty, or any other 
instrument of conveyance also conveys after-acquired title.  Should the 
court take a position that such instruments are akin to a quitclaim deed, as it 
concluded in Aure, it will have a tremendous effect on the examination of 
mineral title.  Historically, it has been commonplace for professional 
landmen to acquire oil and gas interests, “grant” various interests to 
multiple investors, and then subsequently acquire additional oil and gas 
interests in the same lands to be further rationed out.  It is also common for 
an individual to have conveyed all of her right, title, and interest in oil, gas 
and other minerals to a grantee only to subsequently acquire additional 
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interest through the estate of a relative, with no intent to convey such after-
acquired title.  In fact, such situations often did not even contemplate the 
grantor acquiring additional interest subsequent to the original conveyance.  
Retroactive application of this amendment may misconstrue the actual 
intent of the parties to the conveyance and will likely result in more 
litigation to determine the outcome of the conveyance. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court provided well-reasoned guidance for 
its position in Carkuff, which is substantiated by the law of several other 
jurisdictions.  The Legislature should take serious consideration of the 
specific objective of the 2013 amendments and determine whether or not it 
is wise to legislate in derogation of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
holding and whether the legislative amendments truly accomplish such 
objective.  In addition, the Legislature should contemplate whether or not 
the consequences of the adopted language are acceptable or if modifications 
would be appropriate. 
III. MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT 
Marketable title is “title that a reasonable buyer would accept because 
it appears to lack any defect and to cover the entire property that the seller 
has purported to sell.”87  Marketable title acts are intended to limit the scope 
of title examination by cutting off virtually all interests in land that appear 
in the public records prior to a given time.88  Nearly twenty states have 
enacted some form of marketable record title act.89  This section will 
 
87.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1622 (9th ed 2009).  The North Dakota Supreme Court has 
defined marketable title as “fee simple, free from litigation, palpable defects, and grave doubts . . . 
which will enable the purchaser not only to hold the land in peace . . .  but to sell or mortgage it to 
a person of reasonable prudence and caution.”  Kennedy v. Dennstadt, 154 N.W. 271, 274 (N.D. 
1915). 
88.  GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND 
DEVELOPMENT 236-37 (5th ed. 1998).  “The name is unfortunate, for such acts neither declare 
anybody’s title to be marketable nor define marketability.”  Id.  Indeed the Model Act notes that 
the term “marketable record title” as proposed by the Model Act does not mean title which a 
vendee would be compelled to accept, but simply that the forty-year title extinguishes all prior 
interests, subject to very few exceptions.  See LEWIS M. SIMES & CLARENCE B. TAYLOR, THE 
IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 11 (1960).  
89.  CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-33b to 47-33i (2004); FLA. STAT. §§ 712.01 to 712.10 (2000); 
735 III. COMP. STAT. 5/13-118 (2003); IND. CODE §§ 32-20-3-1 to 32-20-4-3 (2002); IOWA CODE 
§§ 614.29 to 614.38 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3401 to 58-3412 (2005); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS §§ 565.101 to 565.109 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 541.023 (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-288 
to 76-298 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47B-1 to 47B-9 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-19.1-01 to 
47-19.1-11 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47 to 5301.56 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 
71 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-13.1-1 to 34-13.1-11 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-30-1 
to 43-30-17 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-1 to 57-9-10 (West 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, 
§§ 601 to 606 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 893.33 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-10-101 to 34-10-109 
(2007).  Some other states have limitations provisions that could apply to particular claims.  For 
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examine the creation of Martketable Record Title Acts, the establishment of 
a chain of title necessary to comply with the Marketable Record Title Act, 
the requirement of possession, and recent legislative amendments 
specifically affecting mineral interests. 
A. CREATION OF THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT 
Michigan legislation, adopted in 1945, formed the precursor of the 
“Model Marketable Title Act,” which Lewis M. Simes and Clarence B. 
Taylor first proposed in 1960.90  The impetus for the Model Act was the 
simple fact that the mere passage of time causes the chain of title to grow 
longer and longer.91  In addition, “[i]ncreased business activity, population 
mobility, home ownership, mortgage financing, population growth and the 
shift from rural to urban land patterns have increased the volume of title 
activity that puts a strain on the present recording system and conveyancing 
practice.”92  As a result, the practice of title examination becomes less and 
less efficient and far more costly.93  The Model Act sought to shorten the 
length of the record required in order to determine marketable title.94  Most 
states require an unbroken chain of forty years to establish marketable 
title.95  The Uniform Marketable Title Act, as approved and recommended 
for enactment by the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform 
State Laws, proposed a thirty-year chain of title be required to establish 
marketable title.96 
The Model Act requires an owner to given notice of a claim to preserve 
his or her interest.97  If no such notice appeared of record during the 
requisite period of time, then all conflicting claims based upon any title 
 
example, California has a modified version of a marketable title act that limits certain kinds of 
claims based on old records. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 880.020 to 887.010 (West 2007). 
90.  Ted. J. Fiflis, The Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation.  By Lewis M. Simes & 
Clarence B. Taylor. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Law School, 1960, 70 YALE L.J. 1409, 
1410 (1961) (reviewing LEWIS M. SIMES & CLARENCE B. TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF 
CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION (1960)).  
91.  Id. at 3. 
92.  John F. Hicks, The Oklahoma Marketable Record Title Act Introduction, 9 TULSA L.J. 
68, 69 (1973). 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. 
95.  See discussion supra note 89.  The “Model Act” recommended such a forty-year period 
suggesting that the requisite period must be long enough to avoid the filing of many claims and 
the deprivation of substantial interests by the operation of the statute. SIMES & TAYLOR, supra 
note 89, at 5. 
96.  See UNIF. MARKETABLE TITLE ACT (1990). 
97.  See SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 3. 
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transaction prior to the requisite period were extinguished.98  This 
effectively worked to eliminate satisfied but unreleased mortgages, titles by 
adverse possession, equitable titles, future interests, and other stale claims.99 
In 1951, the Marketable Record Title Act (“MRTA”) became law in 
North Dakota.100  The legislative purpose identified in North Dakota 
Century Code section 47-19.1-10 is consistent with the reasoning behind 
the Model Act.101  The MRTA defines marketable title as follows: 
Any person that has an unbroken chain of title to any interest in 
real estate and that person’s immediate or remote grantors under a 
conveyance or other title transaction that has been of record for a 
period of twenty years or longer, and is in possession of the 
interest, is deemed to have a marketable record title to the interest, 
subject solely to the claims or defects that are not extinguished or 
barred by the application of this chapter, instruments that have 
been recorded less than twenty years, and encumbrances of record 
not barred by the statute of limitations.102 
As originally enacted, the MRTA required an unbroken chain of thirty 
years.103  In 1957, the Legislature amended the MRTA to reduce the 
necessary time period to twenty years, making it one of the shortest time 
periods required in the United States to establish an unbroken chain of 
title.104  An early analysis of North Dakota’s MRTA suggested that the 
MRTA could bar the following common claims: 
 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. at 4. 
100.  1951 N.D. Sess. Laws 397. See also N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 47-19.1 (2013). 
101.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-10 (2013) (providing  “[t]his chapter shall be construed to 
effect the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating real estate title transactions by 
allowing persons to deal with the record title owner as defined herein and to rely upon the record 
title covering a period of twenty years or more subsequent to the recording of a deed of 
conveyance as set out in section 47-19.1-01, and to that end to bar all claims that affect or may 
affect the interest thus dealt with, the existence of which claims arises out of or depends upon any 
act, transaction, event or omission occurring before the recording of such deed of conveyance, 
unless a notice of such claim, as provided in section 47-19.1-05, shall have been duly filed for 
record.  The claims hereby barred shall mean any and all interest of any nature whatever, however 
denominated, whether such claims are asserted by a person sui juris or under disability, whether 
such person is or has been within or without the state, and whether such person is natural, 
corporate, private or governmental.”). 
102.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-01 (2013). 
103.  See 1951 N.D. Laws ch. 280. 
104.  1957 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 312, § 1; see also SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89, at xxiv 
(explaining that “if the period stated in the Model Marketable Title Act were changed from forty 
years to five or ten years, entirely different consequences would follow.  Instead of extinguishing 
stale claims which have no real validity, it would tend to extinguish all sorts of live claims and 
interests.  And large numbers of notices would constantly be filed to keep claims alive.”); Gardner 
Cromwell, The Improvement of Conveyancing in Montana by Legislation—A Proposal, 22 MONT. 
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(1)  A claim arising under tax title which is more than 30 years 
old. 
(2)  A defective quiet title action, mortgage foreclosure, probate 
proceeding, or sale under a judgment. 
(3)  A deed executed by a husband or wife only without stating 
that it does not cover homestead. 
(4)   Informalities in the execution or acknowledgement of 
conveyances. 
(5)   Interests which are present or future, vested or contingent with 
the exception of the reversionary interest of a lessor or his 
successor and the rights of remaindermen upon expiration of a life 
estate or trust created prior to the date of the recording of the 
conveyance under which title is claimed.105 
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHAIN OF TITLE 
The definition of “Title Transaction” is extraordinarily broad, meaning: 
any transaction affecting title to real estate, including by will or 
descent from any person who held title of record at death, title by a 
decree or order of any court, title by tax deed or by trustee’s 
referee’s, guardian’s executor’s, or sheriff’s deed as well as by 
direct conveyance or reservation.106 
Courts have held a variety of instruments qualify as a title 
transaction.107  In Dennison v. North Dakota Department of Human 
Services, the North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that, because a 
homestead statement was entitled to be recorded pursuant to North Dakota 
Century Code section 50-07-07 (1943), and that under North Dakota 
 
L. REV. 26, 29 (1960) (“A relatively short period, however, may have the effect of cutting off live 
and timely claims (easements or mortgages, for example) simply because the holders failed to 
record a notice.”). 
105.  James E. Leahy, The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act, 29 N.D. L. REV. 265, 
270 (1953).  It should be noted that that the article was written at a time when the unbroken chain 
was required to cover a period of thirty years; the mere act of stating the property conveyed is not 
homestead within the conveyance is insufficient for the purposes of North Dakota Title Standard 
2-02.  See N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 2-02 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 2012). 
106.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-02 (2013).  Note, “or reservation” was included in 2013.  
See 2013 N.D. Laws ch. 351, § 2. 
107.  See generally Mizla v. Depalo, 438 A.2d 820, 820 (Conn. 1981) (finding a warranty 
deed creating an easement constituted a title transaction); Heifner v. Bradford, 446 N.E.2d 440, 
440 (Ohio 1983) (holding a probated will constituted a title transaction); Eisenbarth v. Reusser, 18 
N.E.3d 477 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (holding an oil and gas lease is a title transaction affecting real 
estate); Hazard v. East Hills, Inc., 45 A.3d 1262 (R.I. 2012) (special master found that a boundary 
line agreement was a title transaction). 
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Century Code section 47-19-01 any instrument affecting the title to or 
possession of real property is entitled to be recorded, it followed that the 
Legislature intended a homestead statement to be an instrument affecting 
title to or possession of property.108  This reasoning, however, is not fully 
inclusive.  For instance, a warranty deed with an improper 
acknowledgement is not entitled to be recorded, but on occasion is 
mistakenly accepted by the recorder.109  Such an improperly recorded 
instrument should still be an instrument affecting title.  In Marshall v. 
Hollywood, the Florida Supreme Court held the term “affects title” did not 
carry the narrow meaning of “changing or altering,” but the broader 
meaning of “concerning” or “producing an effect upon.”110  The court 
further reasoned that a void instrument would affect land titles by casting a 
cloud or doubt thereon.111 
It is not, however, a mere title transaction that commences the clock on 
establishing a twenty-year unbroken chain of title.  North Dakota defines 
“unbroken chain” as follows: 
A person is deemed to have the unbroken chain of title to an 
interest in real estate when the records of the county recorder 
disclose a conveyance or other title transaction of record twenty 
years or more which purports to create the interest in that person or 
that person’s immediate or remote grantors, with nothing 
appearing of record purporting to divest that purported interest.112 
It is the conveyance or other title transaction “which purports to create 
the interest in that person” that has been of record more than twenty 
years.113  Practitioners commonly refer to such instrument as the “root 
deed” or “root of title.”114  Courts and commentators have explained the 
root of title concept as follows: 
[T]hat conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title of a 
person, purporting to create the interest claimed by such person, 
upon which he relies as a basis for the marketability of his title, 
and which was the most recent to be recorded as of a date  
 
108.  2002 ND 39, ¶ 1, 640 N.W.2d 447, 449. 
109.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-03 (2013); but see N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-04-01 (2013) 
(curing defects in acknowledgments when such instrument has been of record for a period of five 
years). 
110.  224 So. 2d 743, 749 (Fla. 1969). 
111.  Id. 
112.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-02(1) (2013). 
113.  Id. (emphasis added). 
114.  Id. 
          
2014] A COMPENDIUM OF TITLE ISSUES 359 
 
twenty-three years prior to the time when marketability is being 
determined. The effective date of the “root of title” is the date on 
which it is recorded.115 
The root of title need only purport to create or convey an interest, 
which means that the grantor need not have actually owned the property to 
qualify as a root deed. 
Courts have taken contrary positions in determining what may be a root 
deed.  In Marshall v. Hollywood, the Florida Supreme Court affirmatively 
answered a certified question confirming that a forged deed or “wild deed” 
could constitute a root deed.116  The Marshall case specifically examined 
the ability of a forged deed to divest the true owners of the property when 
the forgery had been of record the requisite period of time.117  The true 
owners of the property did not discover the forgery until some forty-two 
years later, and the true owners had failed to record any notice.118  After 
amicus curiae from the Florida Bar and significant analysis of the purpose 
of the Marketable Record Title Act, the court stated that to determine a 
forged or wild deed could not act as a root deed “would be to disembowel 
the Act through a case dealing with a factual situation of a nature precisely 
contemplated and remedied by the Act itself.  This we cannot do.”119 
The Ohio Court of Appeals arrived at the same conclusion in Straits v. 
Shepler.120  In Straits, Alvina Sprague conveyed the surface by deed to Fred 
W. Waters, reserving all oil and gas in 1916.121  In 1936, Waters conveyed 
the property by deed without being subject to the prior reservation of oil 
and gas.122  Sprague died in 1957 with her will being probated and several 
affidavits for transfer and record of real estate inherited identifying her as 
devisee placed of record.123  This resulted in competing chains in which the 
1936 deed from Waters was deemed a wild deed with regard to the oil and 
gas interests.  The court held that a wild deed could in fact constitute a root 
deed, reasoning as follows: 
 
115.  Obermiller v. Baasch, 823 N.W.2d 162, 170-71 (Neb. 2012) (quoting Gregory B. 
Bartles, Comment, The Nebraska Marketable Title Act:  Another Tool in the Bag, 63 NEB. L. REV. 
124, 136 (1984)). 
116.  Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 236 So. 2d 114, 120 (Fla. 1970). 
117.  Id. at 116. 
118.  Id. at 117 
119.  Id. at 120. 
120.  No. CA 332, 1982 WL 2919, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1982). 
121.  Id. at *3. 
122.  Id. at *4. 
123.  Id. 
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[S]ince the purpose of the marketable title statutes is to eliminate 
the need for searching back to the sovereign, such statutes are not 
concerned with the quality of the title conveyed by the root.  So 
long as the instrument serving as the root of title purports to 
convey an interest, it is effective to extinguish prior claims and 
interests.  Thus, it is possible even for the grantee of a complete 
stranger to divest the title of the record owner.124 
Wyoming has also recognized a wild deed as the root of title.125 In 
Estherholdt, Continental Livestock Co. owned real property and conveyed 
the parcel in question to its president, J.A. Reed, in 1946.126  In 1967, an 
easement was granted to Utah Power and Light Co.127  The easement was 
executed by J. A. Reed as president of Continental Livestock Co., rather 
than in his individual capacity.128  At the time of the easement, Continental 
Livestock Co. had no interest in the property.129  Citing a law review article 
from two University of Wyoming College of Law professors, the court 
noted that “[t]he Act is capable of . . .  recognizing a new title, free of all 
prior claims and defects, in a grantee holding under a wild or maverick 
deed.”130 The Esterholdt court went on to find that nothing “in the Act . . . 
suggests that a wild deed cannot be the root of title for a contestant in a 
controversy under the Act.  In fact, such an interpretation would render the 
methodology of the Act pointless.”131 
Oklahoma, however, refuses to extend such treatment to forged deeds, 
finding that such deeds fall under the “inherent-defect” exception to the 
state’s marketable title act and holding that a forged conveyance is 
ineffective as a muniment of title for any purpose.132  The Mobbs court, 
however, did find a void tax deed that met with explicit legislative 
approbation was an effective muniment of title and did qualify as a valid 
root of title.133  In Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Lawndale 
 
124.  Id. at *8 (quoting Walter E. Barnett, Marketable Title Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium?, 
53 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 57 (1967)) (emphasis contained in original). 
125.  Esterholdt v. Pacificorp, 301 P.3d 1086, 1091 (Wyo. 2013). 
126.  Id. at 1087. 
127.  Id. 
128.  Id. 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. at 1091 (citing Gary B. Conine & Daniel J. Morgan, The Wyoming Marketable Title 
Act—A Revision of Real Property Law, XVI LAND & WATER L. REV. 181, 199 (1981)). 
131.  Id. 
132.  Mobbs v. City of Lehigh, 655 P.2d 547, 552 (Okla. 1982). 
133.  Id. 
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National Bank of Chicago, two competing chains of title existed.134  The 
Illinois Supreme Court held that in such cases of competing chains, a chain 
of title could not be founded upon a wild deed.135 
Wilson v. Kelley held that a quitclaim deed that conveyed all of the 
grantor’s interest did not constitute a root deed, finding that “clearly a 
quitclaim deed is a title transaction, but it appears that it is not possible to 
determine what estate it purports to transfer.”136  The court held that the 
ordinary “quitclaim deed only purported to transfer whatever interest the 
grantor may have had in the land,” and therefore, “it was impossible to 
determine from the face of the instrument what interest or estate in land it 
‘purported to convey.’”137  However, “a quitclaim deed can serve as a root 
of title if it evidences an intent to convey an identifiable interest in the 
land.”138  The court further held that the lack of warranty was not fatal to 
the application of the marketable title act.139 
Nebraska courts have made the same determination.  In Smith v. 
Bendberich, the owner of an undivided one-tenth interest in the real 
property delivered a quitclaim deed to the grantee without covenant, 
warranty, or recital showing an intention not to limit the interest affected by 
the conveyance to that which the grantor then owned.140  The grantee then 
died and, through administration of the estate, the heirs of the grantee were 
assigned the entire tract of land.141  The trial court held that the quitclaim 
deed satisfied the requirements of the Marketable Title Act.142  On appeal, 
the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court, 
holding that a quitclaim deed purports to convey nothing more than the 
interest or estate of the property described of which grantor is  
possessed—rather than the property itself.  Because the quitclaim deed did 
not purport to create, in the grantee, an entire title to the land, it was not the 
kind of conveyance that complies with the conditions of the Marketable 
Title Act.143  Nebraska has nearly identical language in its Marketable Title 
 
134.  Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Lawndale Nat. Bank of Chicago, 243 N.E.2d 193, 
193 (1968). 
135.  Id. at 196 
136.  Wilson v. Kelley, 226 So. 2d 123, 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). 
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Smith v. Berberich, 95 N.W.2d 325, 326-27 (Neb. 1959). 
141.  Id. at 326. 
142.  Id. at 327-28. 
143.  Id. at 329.  The terms of the granting clause of the quitclaim deed were “That the said 
party of the first part . . . by these presents do grant, convey, remise, release, and forever  
quit-claim unto the said party of the second part, and to her heirs and assigns forever, all his right, 
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Act as North Dakota.144  Professor Walter E. Barnett further discussed the 
concept of a quitclaim deed in his early analysis of the marketable title act: 
Actually a bare quit claim deed of “all of grantor’s right, title, and 
interest in and to Blackacre” probably could not serve as a root of 
title to Blackacre, because under Model Act § 8(e) the root of the 
title must “purport to create the interest claimed” by the 
marketable record title holder.  A bare quitclaim does not purport 
to create any specific interest in the grantee.  Smith v. Berberich, 
168 Neb. 142, 95 N.W.2d 325 (1959).  The mere absence of 
warranty covenants, however should not prevent a quitclaim deed 
from serving as a root of title when it evidences an intent to 
convey the land.  For example, some jurisdictions hold that an 
after-acquired title will inure to the benefit of the grantee of such a 
quitclaim deed. [cites omitted] Similarly, although a judicial 
determination of heirship and a probate of a will are title 
transactions within the meaning of the acts, neither could serve as 
a root of title if it did not purport to establish an interest in the 
specific land in question.  A will, however, might well contain a 
specific devise of particular land; and thus 40 years after probate 
the devisee would obtain protection, unavailable to him through 
the recording acts, against prior unrecorded grants from the 
testator.145 
One may argue that the specific interest conveyed by a quitclaim deed, 
personal representative’s deed, or other similar instrument that purports to 
convey all of the grantor’s or decedent’s interest can, in fact, be determined 
simply by examining the interest owned by the grantor or decedent.  
However, the underlying purpose of the MRTA—to shorten the period of 
time for which title must be examined—is completely defeated by such a 
proposition.  In many ways, the MRTA creates an inverse title examination; 
 
title, interest, estate, claim and demand, both at law and in equity, of, in and to the following 
described real estate . . .”  Id.  
144.  Id.  See generally NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-289 (2003); SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89, 
at 347-349. 
145.  Walter E. Barnett, Marketable Title Acts—Panacea or Pandemonium?, 53 CORNELL L. 
REV. 45, 58 n.40 (1967).  Model Act section 8(e) states:  
“Root of title” means that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title of a 
person, purporting to create the interest claimed by such person, upon which he relies 
as a basis for the marketability of his title, and which was the most recent to be 
recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being 
determined.  The effective date of the ‘root of title’ is the date on which it is recorded. 
SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 10.  This definition is substantially similar to that 
promulgated in North Dakota.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-1-02(1) (2013). 
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that is to say, instead of examining title from its inception, the title 
examiner begins with the current owner or owners of record and works 
backwards to establish a twenty-year chain of title.146  A title examiner 
simply cannot establish a chain of title of unknown quantity. 
This process is relatively simple with regard to surface ownership.  It is 
uncommon to have more than a few owners of the surface at any given 
time.  As a result, the interest of any particular owner is often easy to 
calculate.  Conveyances of the surface typically describe the lands or the 
grantor’s precise interest in those lands being conveyed.  That is not the 
case with mineral interests, which are often highly fractionated, sometimes 
having hundreds of owners in a single tract. 
Mineral title examiners frequently come across common drafting errors 
relating to quantity of interest that result in clouds upon title.  For instance, 
assume that Mineral Owner A conveys an undivided 1/10 interest in 
Blackacre to Mineral Owners B, C, and D in equal shares.  Mineral Owner 
B consults with his divorce attorney in Arizona, who claims to be able to 
draft deeds in North Dakota.  Said attorney drafts a deed and copies 
verbatim the legal description of the prior conveyance being “an undivided 
1/10 interest in Blackacre,” despite the fact that Mineral Owner B only 
owns an undivided 1/30 interest in Blackacre.  This scrivener’s error now 
has the potential to become a root deed and eliminate other interests, 
assuming that all other aspects of the MRTA are met. 
Numerous complications also exist in tracts with aliquot parts.  As an 
example, Mineral Owner A owns five net mineral acres in the NE¼ of 
Section 1 and intends to convey all of his interest to Mineral Owner B.  
Mineral Owner A conveys by Mineral Deed an undivided 5/160 interest in 
the NE¼.  The NE¼ of Section 1 is unlikely to contain exactly 160 acres, 
resulting in either an under-conveyance or over-conveyance of Mineral 
Owner A’s interest. 
Additionally, many clients do not know the specific quantity of mineral 
interest.  This is especially true in probate matters where a grandchild may 
be attempting to administer the estate of a grandparent who died several 
decades prior.  Standard form mineral deeds typically include a space for 
inserting the precise interest being conveyed.147  However, because of 
issues concerning unknown quantity of interest and the high probability of 
 
146.  See Johnathan M. Starble, Navigating Connecticut’s Marketable Record Title Act:  A 
Roadmap for the Practitioner, 81 CONN. B. J. 369, 372 (2007). 
147.  See JOHN S. LOWE, OWEN L. ANDERSON, ERNEST E. SMITH, & DAVID E. PIERCE, 
FORMS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 210-14 (5th ed. 
2008). 
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misstating the actual interest owned, practitioners have often turned to 
conveying all or some fraction of the grantor’s interest, such as the 
following language: 
Grantor does hereby grant, convey, transfer and assign unto the 
Grantee all of the Grantor’s undivided interest in and to all of the 
oil, gas, and other minerals, in and under and that may be produced 
from the following described real property. 
Although this issue has yet to be examined by the North Dakota 
Supreme Court, these broad conveyances fail to precisely describe what 
interest is purportedly conveyed, and it is unlikely such conveyances would 
be found acceptable as a root deed establishing an unbroken chain of title. 
Recently, some practitioners have sought means of avoiding probate by 
use of the MRTA.  While “title transaction” is defined to include “any 
transaction affecting title to real estate, including by will or descent from 
any person who held title of record at death,” the means of fulfilling the 
MRTA requirements by such methods are uncommon.148  Proof of Death 
and Affidavits of Heirship are insufficient for purposes of the MRTA.  
Simes notes this fact: 
Obviously, there are distinct limits to the use of affidavits.  They 
cannot supply a deed of conveyance in the chain of title where 
none has been executed.  They are not conveyances, but are only 
instruments for the preservation of rebuttable evidence of certain 
facts . . . It may also be said that affidavits should not be used to 
establish facts which could much more satisfactorily be established 
by other means.  Thus the Iowa court, in applying a very broad 
affidavit statute, refused to permit its use as a substitute for 
administration of a decedent’s estate, where the decedent had died 
recently and there was no reason why administration was not 
practicable.149 
Simes further notes that some jurisdictions have no provision for a 
judicial proceeding to determine heirship, and in such cases affidavits may 
be relied on for such purposes.150  “In some jurisdictions, at least as to an 
earlier state of the law, this may be necessary, since, in effect, the affidavit 
of heirship was a standard muniment of title just as the decree determining 
heirship is in many states today.  If such is the state of the local law, the 
 
148.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-02(2) (2013). 
149.  SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 58 (citing Siedel v. Snider, 44 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 
1950)).  
150.  Id. at 62. 
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model acts should be modified accordingly.”151  North Dakota, however, 
has adopted the Uniform Probate Code, which provides for judicial 
determination of heirs in intestate proceedings.152  North Dakota Title 
Standard 12-01 provides that “persons not claiming through a will may 
establish their title by proof of the decedent’s ownership and death and their 
relationship to the decedent.  The determination of title must be made by an 
order of the court.”153  Alternatively, a personal representative may be 
appointed to confirm title to the assets of the estate in such heirs or 
devisees.154 
One can imagine scenarios in which the MRTA may apply to estate 
proceedings.  For instance, a personal representative’s deed of distribution 
from a foreign domiciliary personal representative whose powers have not 
been established in North Dakota and which specifies the interest conveyed 
would be treated no differently than a wild deed.  Similarly, a deed from an 
unadjudicated heir purporting to convey an identifiable interest in land may 
act as a root deed.  Instances such as this will be rare and will be further 
complicated by the potential for competing chains of ownership. 
C. POSSESSION & 2013 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS 
Neither the Michigan act nor the Model Act require that the person 
claiming title be in possession.155  Instead, in the Model Act, possession is 
treated as a shield for the owner of record to fend off claims of those 
attempting to invoke the act.156  North Dakota, along with South Dakota 
and Nebraska, requires possession by the claimant and provides explicitly 
for the filing of an affidavit to evidence such possession of record.157  The 
specific language of the Act requires that the claimant “is in possession of 
 
151.  Id. 
152.  See generally N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 30.1 (2013). 
153.  N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 12-01 (State Bar Ass’n N.D. 2012). 
154.  Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-12-08(4) (2011)). 
155.  SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 347.   
156.  Id.  Section 4(b) of the Model Act provides: 
 [If] the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in possession 
of such land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during which period no 
title transaction with respect to such interest appears of record in his chain of title, and 
no notice has been filed by him or on his behalf as provided in Subsection (a), and 
such possession continues to the time when marketability is being determined, such 
period of possession shall be deemed equivalent to the filing of the notice immediately 
preceding the termination of the forty-year period described in Subsection (a). 
 Id. at 8. 
157.  Id. at 347.   
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the interest.”158  The purpose of such a requirement, in contrast to the 
Model Act, appears to be an attempt to protect the interests of a senior 
grantee out of possession from being cut off by a junior grantee who is also 
out of possession.159 
The available case law concerning possession only acts to define 
situations in which no possession is found.  In Taylor v. Pennington County, 
certain landowners sought to enjoin the construction of a paved county 
highway over an existing dirt road.  The county road was established in 
1901 by petition and was consistently used as a public roadway.  The 
county failed to record the notice required to preserve its interest under the 
Marketable Title Act.  However, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that 
the landowners were not able to invoke the Marketable Title Act because 
they were not in possession of the easement.  In making its decision, the 
court noted that the South Dakota act differed from other marketable title 
statutes that did not require the person invoking the statute to be in 
possession of the property. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that in order to invoke the 
MRTA one who claims the interest must be in possession of the interest 
claimed.  Thus, in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Advance Realty Co., the 
court held that possession of the surface did not constitute possession of the 
severed minerals, and therefore, the MRTA would not cut off an 
outstanding mineral interest.160  “A mere claim, for whatever time, 
unaccompanied by actual possession, can give no right under the statute.”161  
Furthermore, the court held that actual possession was required: “the oil and 
gas leases . . . while evidence of possession, do not constitute actual 
possession sufficient for adverse possession of the severed mineral 
interest.”162  Prior to 2013, actual possession required production of the 
mineral estate.163 
In 2013, the North Dakota Legislature enacted amendments to the 
MRTA that extended the benefits of the MRTA to severed mineral 
owners.164  North Dakota Century Code section 47-19.1-02(2) now 
expressly includes the reservation of minerals in defining “title 
 
158.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-01 (2013). 
159.  Barnett, supra note 146, at 63. 
160.  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Advance Realty, 78 N.W.2d 705, 719 (N.D. 1956). 
161.  Sickler v. Pope, 326 N.W.2d 86, 93 (N.D. 1982) (citing Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 
889-90 (N.D. 1956)). 
162.  Id. 
163.  See generally 2012 N.D. Att’y Gen. Op. 2012-L-11. 
164.  2013 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 351, § 1; see also Ken G. Hedge, North Dakota—Oil & Gas, 
MIN. L. NEWSL. 23 (Rocky Mt. Min. Law Foundation 2013). 
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transaction.”165  Possession may be established by affidavit.  Formerly the 
affidavit need only include the legal description of the real estate and reflect 
that the record titleholder is in possession of such real estate.166  As 
amended, the affidavit must show that the person is in possession of the 
interest in real estate.167  Although this seems to be a minor detail, it now 
appears that the affidavit must describe what exactly is being claimed.  The 
most substantive change to the MRTA is found in the last sentence of North 
Dakota Century Code section 47-19.1-07: 
For the purpose of this chapter, the fact of possession of an interest 
in real estate referred to in section 47-19.1-01 may be shown of 
record by one or more affidavits containing the legal description of 
the real estate and showing that the person is in possession of the 
interest in real estate.  The recorder shall record the affidavits in 
the miscellaneous records and index the same against the real 
estate.  An affidavit of possession may not be filed before the 
expiration of twenty years from the recording of the conveyance or 
other title transaction under which title is claimed.  The holder of 
an interest in severed minerals is deemed in possession of the 
minerals if that person has used the minerals as defined in section 
38-18.1-03 and the use is stated in the affidavit of possession 
provided for in this section.168 
A mineral interest is now deemed to be in possession if it falls under 
one of the provisions of “use” as defined by the Dormant Mineral Act.  A 
mineral interest is deemed to be used when (1) there is actual production; 
(2) when the mineral is subject to a lease, mortgage, assignment, or 
conveyance of the mineral interest; (3) the interest is subject to an order to 
pool or unitize; (4) taxes are paid on the mineral interest by the owner or the 
owner’s agent; or (5) a statement of claim is recorded.169  There is no case 
law that defines what is actually required of possession; specifically, it is 
ambiguous if the MRTA requires continuous possession or simply 
possession of the interest at the time in which the claim is made.  The 
legislative adoption of “uses” under the Dormant Mineral Act to define 
possession only raises serious questions as to its application.  For instance, 
if continuous possession is required during the twenty year unbroken chain, 
 
165.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-02(2) (2013). 
166.  2013 N.D. Laws ch. 351, § 4. 
167.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-07 (2013). 
168.   Id.  
169.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-03 (2013).   
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will brief periods in which the mineral interest is not leased invalidate a 
claim under the MRTA?  Or, if the mineral interest is unleased, but the 
claimant files a statement of claim two years prior to invoking the 
marketable title act, does he or she still have possession? 
“The actual possession requirement previously established by North 
Dakota case law with respect to the [MRTA] served a legitimate purpose, as 
it does with adverse possession claims.”170  The uses expounded upon in the 
Dormant Mineral Act were designed to prevent the forfeiture of a real 
property interest by requiring minimal efforts from their owners.  The 
inclusion of these same uses in the MRTA now allows strangers to 
substantiate possession of a mineral interest and potentially wrangle title of 
the minerals from legitimate owners with the same minimal effort.  By 
defining possession by these various uses, the Legislature has created a 
situation that will increase unmarketability. 
In the past, producers of mineral interests exercising sound business 
practices would obtain title opinions covering the real property—typically 
before commencing operations—but at the very least, before distribution of 
royalty interests.  Conveyances or leases of mineral interests from strangers 
to title would often be identified in the title opinion but could be 
“disregarded, unless a title examiner has actual notice or knowledge 
(through sources other than the record) of the interest of the grantor.”171  
This process acted in some ways as a safeguard from errant claims.  Now, if 
a mineral deed appears of record with an error in the legal description 
followed by a statement of claim relying upon the incorrect legal 
description, and perhaps then a lease, these errant instruments cannot be 
disregarded because they have the ability to ripen into actual title by way of 
the MRTA.  This problem is compounded by the fractionated nature of 
mineral interests.  It becomes difficult, if not impossible, for a mineral 
owner to know if a claimant under the MRTA is making a claim against his 
or her mineral interest or the mineral interest of another. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has cautioned against the use of oil 
and gas leases in the context of adverse possession, holding that while 
leases may offer evidence of possession, they do not constitute actual 
 
170.  Hedge, supra note 164, at 24 (explaining “[a]ctual possession of a surface estate is 
open and visible to the whole world, such that if someone has actual possession of the surface 
estate for a period in excess of 20 years, and bases their claim on an instrument of record for more 
than 20 years, one can feel fairly confident that there are no other legitimated adverse claimants to 
the land.”).   
171.  N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 2-01 (State Bar Ass’n N.D. 2012). 
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possession sufficient for adverse possession.172  “To hold otherwise would 
be to allow any person in possession of a severed surface estate to lease the 
mineral estate beneath his land for the requisite statutory period and then 
claim valid title to the mineral estate against the record owner by adverse 
possession.”173 
D. A CALL FOR REFORM 
While the 2013 legislative changes were no doubt well-intended, the 
ramifications were likely unexpected.  Serious consideration should be 
given to the requirement of possession and the important role in which it 
plays in the MRTA.  The Legislature should first clarify whether possession 
is required for the full, unbroken chain of title, some lesser amount of time, 
or if, in fact, it is only necessary at the time in which a claimant invokes the 
MRTA.  Defining possession of mineral interests by the minimum uses 
described in the Dormant Mineral Act should be repealed, and an actual 
production requirement should be reinstated.  To resolve concerns about 
ancient title defects in a chain, the Legislature should explore the possibility 
of enacting specific curative statutes directed at the most common title 
defects: tax titles, homestead conveyances without proper execution or 
acknowledgment, minor defects in estate conveyances, and the like.  A 
definition for root deed should be added to the MRTA specifying exactly 
what may or may not constitute the commencement of an unbroken chain of 
title.  In addition, thought should be given to the interaction of the MRTA 
and other acts affecting conveyances, such as the Uniform Probate Code, so 
that some level of uniformity can be maintained.  Last, any such legislation 
should be clear as to whether it is prospective or retroactive. 
IV. ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD 
The sanctity of the family home is an American ideal.  Homestead laws 
seek to protect the family dwelling place from creditors of either spouse and 
prevent the alienation of the homestead by one spouse without the other’s 
consent.  This section will examine the history and development of 
homestead laws in North Dakota, the application of homestead laws to the 
mineral estate, and finally consider whether such application is outmoded 
given the creation of surface owner protections. 
 
172.  Sickler v. Pope, 326 N.W.2d 86, 93 (N.D. 1982). 
173.  Id. 
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A. HISTORY OF HOMESTEAD LAWS 
Laws protecting the homestead trace their origins to a statute of the 
Republic of Texas in 1839.174  The policy reasons for homestead laws vary 
from state to state.  The Supreme Court of Iowa has stated: 
“The Law is based upon the idea that, as a matter of public policy, 
for the promotion of the property of the state, and to render 
independent and above want each citizen of the government, it is 
proper he should have a home—a homestead—where his family 
may be sheltered and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune 
and the demands of creditors who have given credit under such 
law.”175 
The safeguards afforded by these homestead provisions were not 
limited to the debtor but also his family.  “The Convention . . . engrafted 
this beneficent provision for the protection and maintenance of the wife and 
children against the neglect and improvidence of the father and husband.”176  
In turn, the protection of the homestead from external creditors naturally 
extended to protecting spouses and dependents from internal  
sources—alienation of the homestead by the owner.  Early California 
decisions likened these homestead rights as something akin to joint 
tenancy.177  In fact, when read in conjunction with various probate code 
provisions, there are several similarities.178 
 
174.  George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (1950). 
175.  Chalress v. Lamberson, 1 Clarke 435, 439 (Iowa 1855).   
176.  Cook v. McChristian, 4 Cal. 23, 26 (1854).  
177.  Taylor v. Hargous, 4 Cal. 268, 273 (1854) (“It is turned into a sort of joint tenancy, 
with the right of survivorship, at least as between husband and wife, and this estate cannot be 
altered or destroyed, except by the concurrence of both, in the manner provided by law.”).  Taylor 
was subsequently overturned in part.  See Gee v. Moore, 14 Cal. 472, 477 (1859).   
178.  Barber v. Babel, 36 Cal. 16, 17 (1868) (“But we do not perceive why the character of 
the right, as defined, does not substantially approach very near a joint tenancy, although not 
created in precisely the same way, even if not a technical joint tenancy at common law.  In the 
homestead estate most of the unities of the joint tenancy are found, for it is created by the same 
instrument and at the same time.  The homestead right and the joint interests are created by the 
executing, acknowledging, and recording of the declaration.  The new character of the estate . . . 
accruing by one and the same conveyance, (or act,) commencing at one and the same time, and 
held by one and the same undivided possession.  If the husband controls the property during the 
coverture, it is not because he has a greater, more valuable, or different interest in the homestead 
from that of the wife, but because the law has made him the head of the household and devolved 
upon him the duty of management, not for his own interest merely, but for the joint benefit of 
both.  And since the amendment of 1862, the right of survivorship, the grand incident of joint 
tenancy, is added.  The main substantial difference now seems to be, the want of power in one of 
the parties to sever the tenancy, or convey it all, without the concurrence of the other in the mode 
prescribed.  But however this may be there is a joint interest in the homestead—a joint holding, if 
not a technical joint tenancy.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
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North Dakota has recognized the importance of the homestead since 
adopting its constitution in 1889,179 and it has equally utopian reasons for 
enacting its homestead provisions: 
The object of the homestead exemption law is the protection of the 
family to afford an asylum for the protection and support of the 
family in order that such family and children may be protected 
from the enervating effects of poverty, which to a large degree is 
the recruiting ground of disease and crime, and to provide an 
opportunity whereby such children may be properly developed 
physically, morally, and intellectually to assume and perform the 
true and proper duties of citizenship, and thus strengthening the 
state.180 
B. DEFINITION OF HOMESTEAD 
What constitutes a homestead has changed over the course of time.  As 
the word implies, the homestead is “the house, outbuildings and adjoining 
land owned and occupied by a person or family as a residence.”181  Because 
homestead provisions are ultimately designed to protect the family against 
creditors, jurisdictions have necessarily debated the extent to which a debtor 
is entitled to protection.  This leads to important discussions on not only the 
value of the homestead property, but also the extent of the area to which 
one is entitled to claim.  As originally enacted, North Dakota defined 
homestead as follows: 
Homestead Exempt.  A homestead owned by either husband or 
wife, not exceeding in value $5,000, consisting of a dwelling 
house in which the homestead claimant resides, and all its 
appurtenances, and the land on which the same is situated, shall be 
exempt from judgment lien and from execution or forced sale, 
except as provided in this chapter.182 
In 1895, the definition of homestead was amended to limit the 
homestead to not only $5,000.00, but also “if within a town plat, not 
exceeding two acres in extent, and if not within a town plat, not exceeding 
 
179.  N.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 208 (1889).  Article six, section twenty-two of the North 
Dakota Constitution reads, in part:  “The right of the debtor to enjoy the comforts and necessaries 
of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting from forced sale to all heads of families 
a homestead, the value of which shall be limited and defined by law.”  N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 22. 
180.  Swingle v. Swingle, 162 N.W. 912, 912 (N.D. 1917). 
181.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (10th ed. 2014). 
182.  1891 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 67, § 1. 
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in the aggregate more than one hundred and sixty acres.183  In 1943, the 
value of the homestead limitation was increased to “$8,000.00 over and 
above liens or encumbrances, or both” for those homesteads located within 
a town plat, and for homesteads not within a town plat the value limitation 
was completely removed from the equation.184  The value limitation on 
homesteads within a town plat was increased to $25,000.00 in 1951,185 and 
to $40,000.00 in 1967.186  In 1977, the Legislature did away with area 
limitations for both homesteads within and without of a town plat, reverting 
back to a strictly value based definition and increased the allowable value to 
$60,000.00.187  In 1979, the Legislature repealed archaic language 
concerning the “head of family” and further increased the allowable value 
to $80,000.00.188  And finally in 2009, the Legislature increased the 
allowable value to $100,000.00.189  The North Dakota Century Code section 
47-18-01 currently defines the homestead as follows: 
The homestead of any individual, whether married or unmarried, 
residing in this state consists of the land upon which the claimant 
resides, and the dwelling house on that land in which the 
homestead claimant resides, with all its appurtenances, and all 
other improvements on the land, the total not to exceed one 
hundred thousand dollars in value, over and above liens or 
encumbrances or both.  The homestead shall be exempt from 
judgment lien and from execution or forced sale, except as 
otherwise provided in this chapter.  The homestead may not 
embrace different lots or tracts of land unless the lots or tracts of 
land are contiguous.  For purposes of this section, “contiguous” 
means two or more tracts of real property which share a common 
point or which would share a common point but for an intervening 
road or right of way.190 
Notably, the title of the current statutory provision continues to refer to 
area—something that has not been present in the definition of homestead 
since 1977. 
 
183.  N.D.R.C. § 3605 (1895). 
184.  N.D.R.C. § 47-1801 (1943). 
185.  1951 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 277, § 1. 
186.  1967 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 362, § 1. 
187.  1979 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 488, § 7. 
188.  1979 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 489, § 1. 
189.  2009 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 276, § 8. 
190.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (2013). 
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C. ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD 
Like most jurisdictions in the United States, North Dakota, has codified 
statutes that seek to protect the family home from alienation by the owner 
without the consent of his or her spouse.  North Dakota first enacted 
homestead laws in 1891 as part of the Second Session of Laws.  The first 
provision concerning alienation of the homestead was found in chapter 67, 
section 4 as follows:  “§ Acknowledgement of Husband And Wife.  The 
homestead of a married person cannot be conveyed or incumbered [sic] 
unless the instrument by which it is conveyed or incumbered [sic] is 
executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife.”191  The provision 
has changed little over the course of time.192  The current version has been 
modified to remove any limitation on alienation of the homestead based 
upon value:  “The homestead of a married person, without regard to the 
value thereof, cannot be conveyed or encumbered unless the instrument by 
which it is conveyed or encumbered is executed and acknowledged by both 
the husband and wife.”193  Courts have interpreted a conveyance of the 
homestead to include a conveyance of any form of interest including sales 
contracts,194 contract for deeds,195 leases,196 mortgages,197 and outright 
conveyances of fee simple absolute.198 
A perplexing conflict exists between the current definition of 
homestead and the restrictions on alienation.  The basis for determining the 
extent of homestead property is value.199  However, a conveyance of 
homestead property completely disregards this limiting factor, resulting in 
the question of what exactly cannot be conveyed without being executed 
and acknowledged by husband and wife.  For instance, assume that O owns 
free and clear the NE¼ consisting of 160 acres and valued at $10,000.00 per 
acre.  Assume further that within the SE¼NE¼, O has a modest  
three-bedroom ranch style home with a two-car garage confined to one acre 
with an unencumbered value of $90,000.00.  Pursuant to North Dakota 
 
191.  1891 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 67, § 4. 
192.  See, e.g., N.D.R.C. § 5608 (1913); N.D.R.C. § 5052 (1905); N.D.R.C. §3608 (1899); 
N.D.R.C. §3608 (1895).  
193.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-05 (2013).  
194.  Silander v. Gronna, 108 N.W. 544 (N.D. 1906). 
195.  Larson v. Cole, 33 N.W.2d 325 (N.D. 1948). 
196.  Jessen v. Pingel, 257 N.W. 2 (N.D. 1934); but see Wegner v. Lubenow, 95 N.W. 442 
(N.D. 1903). 
197.  Grotberg v. First Nat. Bank, 210 N.W. 21 (N.D. 1926). 
198.  Severtson v. Peoples, 148 N.W. 1054 (N.D. 1914). 
199.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (2013). 
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Century Code section 48-18-01,200 the homestead could be limited to the 
one acre with home and the remainder subject to execution of judgment and 
division pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section 48-18-12.201  
However, if O is married, it is unclear whether O is prohibited from 
conveying, for instance, the one acre on which the home is located—the 
SE¼NE¼—or the full NE¼ without joinder of his or her spouse.  This issue 
is compounded further if O also owns the NW¼, a contiguous parcel, and 
could claim the entire N½ as being subject to North Dakota Century Code 
section 47-18-05. 
It is plausible that the reference to value was included to prevent the 
argument that a $500,000.00 home located on a one-acre platted parcel was 
somehow exempt from the requirements of North Dakota Century Code 
section 47-18-05 due to the fact that it exceeds the $100,000.00 allowable 
value of a homestead; but if that is indeed the case, it has other 
implications.  Our neighboring states do not have such provisions for 
disregarding value.  However, both Minnesota and South Dakota limit the 
homestead by area.202 
Prior to various legislative amendments, the conflict between the 
definition of homestead and alienation of homestead did not exist.  In 
Severtson v. Peoples, a deed executed by Ernest S. Severtson and Pearle E. 
Severtson, husband and wife, purported to convey “11 lots in Block 7, and 
7 lots in [B]lock 4 in the village of New Rockford” to the defendant.203  The 
plaintiffs, however, alleged that the wife did not acknowledge the deed and 
that she executed it under coercion, intimidation, duress, and undue 
influence by the defendant.The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs 
and ruled: 
[a]s to the homestead interest of said Pearle E. Severtson and 
Ernest S. Severtson, her husband, in said premises as defined by 
law, which said homestead interest is to be ascertained as provided 
 
200.  Id. 
201.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-12 (2013). 
202.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 507.02, 510.02 (2014) (providing that a homestead may include 
any quantity of land not to exceed 160 acres or a value of $390,000.00 or if used for agricultural 
purposes $975,000.00).  Until 2007, Minnesota also distinguished between platted lots within a 
city and un-platted lands located outside of a city by defining homestead as up to a one-half acre 
platted lot or 160 acres of un-platted lands.  See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-31-4 (2013) (“If 
within a town plat the homestead must not exceed one acre in extent, and if not within a town plat, 
it must not embrace in the aggregate more than one hundred sixty acres.”); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 
70-32-104, 70-32-301 (2013).  
203.  Severtson, 148 N.W. at 1054.  The definition of homestead at the time of Severtson, 
constituted two acres within a platted town site, with a value that does not exceed $5,000.00.  Id. 
at 1056. 
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by law, and that said deed be decreed to convey no interest or 
estate in, or lien or incumbrance [sic] upon said homestead interest 
in said property.204 
On appeal the North Dakota Supreme Court was unable to determine 
what the trial court intended, noting that the trial court failed to make a 
determination of what constituted the homestead and appeared to leave such 
a finding for a later time and proceeding.  In its decision, the Severtson 
court cited Chief Justice Bartholomew’s opinion in Foogman v. Patterson: 
“While the party may select his homestead from any portion of a 
tract much larger than the law allows for a homestead, it 
necessarily follows that no homestead can be identified until the 
selection is made.” . . . It is ‘the homestead as created, defined, and 
limited by law’ that is absolutely exempt.  We have already seen 
what that means.  A mere floating homestead right, unattached to 
any land in a manner that can identify the . . . homestead, cannot 
create an absolute exemption in land that may subsequently be 
designated and identified as a homestead.205 
The court then concluded that a deed will not be adjudged to be void in 
toto when it covers not only the homestead but also other lands.  It will, in 
such a case, be declared void merely as to the homestead.  In offering 
direction to the trial court, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the 
plaintiff alleged to reside only upon the lots in block 7 and that those lots in 
block 4 were not contiguous.206  Because they were not contiguous, there 
was no possibility of finding that the homestead covered all of the described 
lands. 
On rehearing, the court was presented with the very argument that the 
Legislature has now constructed—that the area and value of the homestead 
of plaintiffs are wholly immaterial when the homestead is conveyed without 
the execution and acknowledgement of both spouses where the rights of 
creditors are in no way involved.207  The court noted that the Legislature 
limited the homestead not only to creditors, but also to heirs.208  In view of 
 
204.  Id. 
205.  Id. at 1057 (citing Foogman v. Patterson, 83 N.W. 15 (N.D. 1900)).  
206.  Id. 
207.  Id. at 1058. 
208.  Id.  The current application of homestead limitations to heirs is found at North Dakota 
Century Code section 30-16-09, which provides: 
If the court finds that the homestead selected in an estate exceeds in value any 
limitation fixed by law and that the property cannot be divided without material injury, 
the order setting it apart must determine the amount of such excess, and thereafter the 
property to the extent of the excess so determined may be subjected, after all of the 
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such policy, the court correctly asked “how can it be seriously contended 
that no such restrictions or limitations were contemplated in favor of 
vendees?”209  There appears no basis for arguing that North Dakota Century 
Code section 47-18-05 was intended to expand the definition of homestead 
when the underlying public policy rational is to preserve the homestead for 
both spouses against the decisions of a single spouse. 
It is impossible for a title examiner to make any conclusions as to the 
size of homestead when the homestead is defined by value.  The North 
Dakota Title Standards presume that any conveyance of the surface includes 
homestead property.210  The general rule applied by practitioners and those 
associated with real estate closings has been that it takes “one to buy, two to 
sell.”  In other words, if real property is being conveyed, the surface is 
involved, and the owner is married, both husband and wife must sign 
regardless of whether the real property constitutes homestead or not.211  It is 
a simple bright-line rule that provides the protection necessary to insure that 
such a conveyance is valid.  However, it also avoids confronting the 
ambiguity in the definition of the current statute. 
D. ALIENATION OF THE HOMESTAD MINERAL ESTATE 
At common law, the owner of land in fee simple absolute was said to 
own the land from heaven to hell.212  The landowner alone was entitled to 
prospect for, sever, and remove from the land anything found on or beneath 
the surface.213  A mineral interest is a real property interest created in 
place.214  It is well established that a general conveyance of land without 
exception or reservation conveys to the grantee both the surface and mineral 
 
other available property has been exhausted, to the payment of debts in the same 
manner as other property.   
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-09 (2013). 
209.  Severtson, 148 N.W. at 1058-59. 
210.  N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 2-02 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 2012).  This standard requires 
evidence of marital status or evidence that the property conveyed did not constitute the grantor’s 
homestead when a conveyance has been recorded and no spouse has joined or where marital status 
is not indicated anywhere in the deed.  Id. 
211.  An alternative, if the real property being conveyed is in fact non-homestead, is to 
execute and record an affidavit consistent with the requirements of North Dakota Century Code 
sections 47-19-11 and 47-19-12 evidencing that the premises do not constitute the homestead of 
the grantor or the grantor’s family.  Such affidavit may be executed solely by the grantor, without 
joinder of the grantor’s spouse; however, it is insufficient to include the same recitals within the 
conveyance itself.  N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 2-02 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 2012).   
212.  See PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, OIL AND GAS LAW § 202, (9th ed. 
2011) (“Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos.”). 
213.  Id. 
214.  Texaro Oil Co. v. Mosser, 299 N.W.2d 191, 194 (N.D. 1980).  See also Schulz v. 
Hauck, 312 N.W.2d 360, 361 (1981); Payne v. A. M. Fruh Co. 98 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1959). 
          
2014] A COMPENDIUM OF TITLE ISSUES 377 
 
estates.215  However, a conveyance of minerals “gives to the mineral owner 
the incidental right of entering, occupying, and making such use of the 
surface lands as is reasonably necessary in exploring, mining, removing, 
and marketing the minerals.”216 The same holds true for the typical oil and 
gas lease.217  The result is that the mineral estate is deemed to be the 
dominant estate.218 
The underlying question, then, is whether or not a mineral deed or lease 
can be or should be deemed to be an alienation of homestead.  In Franklin 
Land Co. v. Wea Gas, Coal & Oil, Co., the Kansas Supreme Court 
addressed this very question.219  The court held “that a lease of a 
homestead, under which the lessee takes possession of the premises in such 
a way as to interfere with the possession and enjoyment by the wife of the 
homestead, is such an alienation of the homestead as, under the constitution 
and statute . . . requires joint consent of the husband and wife.”220  The 
court, after analyzing the lease, determined that the lessee was lawfully 
entitled to occupy as much or all of the surface as he found “necessary [in 
order] to erect thereon derricks and enginehouses; to prospect for gas, coal, 
oil, or any other mineral substance; and if anything valuable is found, to 
erect buildings in which to store such product.”221  Thus, the key factor is 
not the extraction of minerals from the property, but to what extent the 
surface is impacted by such activities. 
Similarly, the Texas Civil Appellate Court found that a contract 
conveying all the oil, gas, coal, and other minerals, together with right of 
ingress and egress and reserving an undivided one-tenth to the grantor, was 
invalid.  The court noted “the right to construct machinery for the boring 
and digging of wells, and the right to erect derricks, build tanks, and place 
boilers, engines and machinery . . . would destroy the homestead use of the 
property, or to at least a portion of the same” and that the contract did not 
limit the amount of land the company could take for such purposes.222 
The conveyance of homestead property and the underlying minerals 
has appeared before the North Dakota Supreme Court on a number of 
 
215.  Schulz, 312 N.W.2d at 361 (citing Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753, 755 (N.D. 
1971)). 
216.  Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 550 (N.D. 1973). 
217.  Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829, 834 (N.D. 1969). 
218.  Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979); see also Ernest R. Fleck, 
Severed Mineral Interests, 51 N.D. L. REV. 369 (1974). 
219.  Franklin Land Co. v. Wea Gas, Coal & Oil Co., 23 P. 630 (Kan. 1890). 
220.  Id. at 632. 
221.  Id. 
222.  S. Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 69 S.W. 169, 170-71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902). 
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occasions—seemingly always in the context of fraud.  In Dixon v. 
Kaufman, Clarence and Elizabeth Dixon executed a mineral deed to W. C. 
Kaufman, Jr., and the Dixon’s alleged that they were led to believe the 
document signed was an oil lease in which they would receive an eighth 
royalty.223  The grantee’s agent took the instrument “to a notary public who 
had previously taken acknowledgements for the Dixons and was familiar 
with their signatures.”224  Although disputed by Elizabeth Dixon, the notary 
claimed to have confirmed with her by telephone that she and her husband 
executed the document.225  The notary completed the certificate of 
acknowledgment attached to the deed.226  The deed included the SW¼ of 
Section 31, Township 160 North, Range 82 West, being the plaintiff’s 
homestead.227  The North Dakota Supreme Court found that any 
conveyance of homestead property without proper acknowledgement was 
void, relying solely on a similar case from Illinois, Logue v. Von Almen.228 
Two similar cases often cited for the proposition that a mineral 
conveyance of homestead property that does not comply with the 
requirements of North Dakota Century Code section 47-18-05 is void are 
Hoffer v. Crawford and Dockter v. Crawford.229  In both cases, the plaintiffs 
alleged that mineral deeds to defendant, D. W. Crawford, were obtained by 
fraud.230  In each case, the mineral deeds conveyed minerals underlying the 
plaintiffs’ homesteads as well as other lands.231  The husband and wife in 
both cases executed the mineral deed at their homes and did not appear 
before a notary public.232  Crawford conceded that neither mineral deed was 
 
223.  Dixon v. Kaufman, 58 N.W.2d 797, 804 (N.D. 1953). 
224.  Id. at 804. 
225.  Id.  
226.  Id. 
227.  Id. at 800. 
228.  Id. (citing Logue v. Von Almen, 40 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. 1941)).  While Logue fails to 
analyze why a mineral deed that conveys an interest in homestead property would be void, it was 
well established in Illinois that such was the case.  The Supreme Court of Illinois addressed this 
issue in Bruner v. Hicks, where the court found that an oil and gas lease that: 
assigns the right to use, possess, and enjoy a portion of said premises for the purpose 
of mining and operating for oil and gas, and laying pipe lines and building tanks, 
stations, and structures thereon to take care of said products, deprived [the homestead 
claimants] of a portion of their homestead, and, said homestead not having been 
waived or released in accordance with the terms of the statute, said lease was void.  
82 N.E. 888, 891 (Ill. 1907).  
229.  Hoffer v. Crawford, 65 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 1954); Dockter v. Crawford, 65 N.W.2d 691 
(N.D. 1954).  
230.  Dockter, 65 N.W.2d at 692. 
231.  Id. 
232.  Id. at 693. 
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effective as to homestead property.233  Consequently, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court held, without need for further discussion, that no title to the 
minerals in or under the homesteads passed to D. W. Crawford.234 
E. HOMESTEAD APPLICATION IN LIGHT OF NORTH DAKOTA SURFACE 
 PROTECTION LAWS 
It is important to remember that the body of case law first asserting 
homestead protection to minerals is derived from an era that offered little 
credence to the surface owner.  The images of Boiler Avenue in Spindletop 
lined with as many derricks as physically possible evidence the tremendous 
impact that drilling practices of the time had on the surface estate.235  It was 
said that the derricks on Spindletop “were so close together that workmen 
laid planks from one wooden structure to the next so they could make a 
quick escape when an oil fire flared up.”236  It was an era in which the 
mineral developers were allowed unrestricted use of as much of the surface 
as necessary for their operations.  The concept of a dominant mineral estate, 
however, began to evolve.237  The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the 
“accommodation doctrine” in 1979, holding that the owner of a dominant 
mineral estate must make reasonable accommodations when using the 
surface for developing and producing the minerals on particular land.238 
North Dakota first enacted the Surface Owner Protection Act in 
1975.239  The Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation statues were 
later enacted in 1979.240  The Oil and Gas Production Damage 
Compensation Act provides for numerous safeguards for the surface 
owner.241  North Dakota Century Code section 38-11.1-04 requires the 
 
233.  Id. 
234.  Id. 
235.  Rance L. Craft, Of Reservoir Hogs and Pelt Fiction: Defending the Ferae Natura 
Analogy Between Petroleum and Wildlife, 44 EMORY L.J. 697, 701 (1995).  Discovery of oil at the 
Spindletop salt dome near Beaumont, Texas led to the drilling of 440 wells on 125 acres in a 
year’s time.  The overproduction of Spindletop led Captain Anthony F. Lucas, who made its first 
discovery in 1901, to note:  “The cow was milked too hard, and moreover she was not milked 
intelligently.”  Id. 
236.   Id. at 700 n.19 (quoting RICHARD O’CONNOR, THE OIL BARONS:  MEN OF GREED AND 
GRANDEUR 81 (1971)). 
237.  See Fleck, supra note 218 (“The severance of the mineral estate from the surface estate 
in land has caused some problems, litigation and legislation over the years, but these were 
minimized by general acceptance of the doctrine of mineral estate dominance.  Today, however, 
there appears to be an erosion of this concept and an increased concern for the rights of the surface 
owner.”). 
238.  Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979). 
239.  See 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 321, §1; N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-18 (2013). 
240.  See 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 396, §4; N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-11.1 (2013). 
241.  See generally N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-11.1 (2013). 
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mineral developer to pay the surface owner for damages sustained, lost land 
value, lost use of and access to the surface owner’s land, and lost value of 
improvements caused by drilling operations.242  A surface owner who 
obtains his or her water supply from underground sources is entitled to the 
cost of making repairs, alterations, or construction that will ensure the 
delivery of water in equal quality and quantity as before drilling 
operations.243  The surface owner is further entitled to payments “for loss of 
agricultural production and income caused by oil and gas production and 
completion operations,”244 damages sustained for loss of agricultural 
production caused by mining activity, and to the fair market value of a farm 
building that comes within five hundred feet of a surface mining 
operation.245 
In addition to compensation, various permitting requirements have 
been enacted for not only the drilling and production of oil and gas, but for 
surface mining as well.  North Dakota Century Code section 38-08-5(2) 
provides safeguards to surface owners by prohibiting the issuance of a 
drilling permit within five hundred feet of an occupied dwelling, except in 
limited circumstances. 246  If such permit is issued “within one thousand 
feet of an occupied dwelling,” the owner of such dwelling may request the 
operator to place “the location of all flares, tanks, and treaters utilized in 
connection with the permitted well” farther away from the dwelling than the 
well bore if such location can be accommodated reasonably within the well 
pad.247  Similarly, before the Public Service Commission may issue a 
permit to surface mine land, each surface owner must provide statements of 
consent, a mineral lease, or surface lease from the surface owner.248  No 
surface coal mining is permitted within five hundred feet of any occupied 
dwelling unless approved by the owner thereof.249  Finally, areas within five 
 
242.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (2013).   
243.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-06 (2013); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.2-07 
(2013). 
244.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-08.1 (2013); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.2-04 
(2009). 
245.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-07 (1) (2013). 
246.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-05(2) (2013). 
247.   Id. 
248.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-06 (2013).  “Surface owner” is defined as the person or 
persons who presently have valid title to the surface of the land, their successors, assigns, or 
predecessors in title, regardless of whether or not a portion of the land surface is occupied for a 
residence.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-05(10) (2013).  This definition excludes a spouse who does 
not have title.   
249.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-14.1-07 (2013); but see N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-14.1-08 (2013) 
(“The designation of an area as unsuitable for all types or certain types of surface coal mining 
operations does not prevent the mineral exploration of such an area.”). 
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hundred feet of an inhabited rural residence must be considered exclusion 
areas for energy conversion facilities and energy transmission facilities 
unless waived by the owner.250 
While some may contend that the protections afforded to North Dakota 
surface owners remain inadequate, one cannot deny that the protections 
enacted satisfy the public policy rational for all homesteads—regardless of 
whether the homestead is located on lands with unified estates or lands in 
which the minerals have been severed.  In fact, as surface protections have 
evolved, it is difficult to justify inclusion of the mineral estate in the 
definition of homestead.  There appears little reasoning for treating unified 
estates any different than severed estates. 
By removing minerals from the definition of homestead, common 
errors in mineral conveyances may be eliminated.  Frequently instruments 
attempt to circumvent the homestead requirements by identifying the 
grantor as a “married person dealing in his or her sole and separate 
property” when in fact the grantor’s spouse must still execute and 
acknowledge the instrument.  Oftentimes in an attempt to cure a void 
homestead conveyance a party will obtain a ratification or separate deed 
executed and acknowledged from the originally-omitted spouse alone.  
However, a separate instrument from the non-joining spouse does not meet 
the requirements of N.D. Cent. Code sect. 47-18-05; both spouses must 
execute and acknowledge the curative instrument.251  This is not to suggest 
that the definition should be amended to exclude minerals to rectify poor 
drafting on behalf of those who should have greater understanding of the 
laws of North Dakota, but it does reflect the all-too-common belief that a 
sole owner of minerals has the right to convey without limitation.  Until and 
unless such a change is made to the definition of homestead, best practices 
require practitioners and landmen to be diligent in obtaining proper 
execution and acknowledgement from both husband and wife of any 
conveyance of a mineral interest in which the grantor also owns a surface 
interest in the conveyed lands. 
 
250.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-22-05.1 (2013).  Notably, “owner” is not defined by the statute 
and does not appear to require the owner’s spouse to also waive such restrictions; nor does it 
require waiver from the actual inhabitant.  The right to enter upon the property for such purposes 
however would be a conveyance requiring the execution and acknowledgement by a spouse if the 
property is deemed to be homestead. 
251.  See N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 2-05 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 2012); see also Portland 
Credit Union v. Hauge, 169 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1969); Neset v. Rudman, 74 N.W.2d 826 (N.D. 
1956). 
          
382 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:337 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of after-acquired property, the Marketable Record Title 
Act, and alienation of homestead are three issues common to any real estate 
attorney’s practice.  A cursory understanding of any of these issues may 
give practitioners or lawmakers an erroneous sense of enlightenment.  
Without fully understanding the history, the policy rational, and the 
development of both statutory and case law of each topic, practitioners and 
lawmakers alike are prone to encountering unintended consequences.  Just 
as the portion of the iceberg lurking underneath the surface of the water 
threatens passing ships with their demise, the application of these topics 
without a sufficient understanding of each, especially in relationship to 
mineral interests, will result in serious and substantial consequences.  Thus, 
practitioners must give serious consideration to the 2013 legislative 
amendments to the doctrine of after-acquired title and the Marketable 
Record Title Act and must not only understand the implications of the 
amendments, but also address the consequences created by the changes.  
Legislators must give further consideration to the changes they enacted and 
decide whether or not such amendments accomplished the intended goal 
without creating unintended consequences and without inflicting harm upon 
the status of real property titles.  The methodical and well-reasoned 
evolution of laws protecting surface owners from the exploration and 
development of mineral resources should cause lawmakers to question 
whether or not the century-old application of homestead laws remain 
applicable to mineral interests. 
Property law and real estate titles are necessarily bound to 
predictability and certainty.252  Any changes made to well-established real 
property law must first be painstakingly analyzed and thoughtfully enacted.  
Practitioners too must master the nuances and develop a firm understanding 
of the complex issues that lie hidden beneath the surface of a cursory 
review.  Only then will unintended consequences—the collision with the 
unseen portion of the iceberg—be avoided. 
 
 
252.  Lario Oil & Gas Co. v. EOG Res., Inc., 2013 ND 98, ¶ 17, 832 N.W.2d 49, 54 
(VandeWalle, C.J., specially concurring); James v. Griffin, 2001 ND 90, ¶ 15, 626 N.W.2d 704, 
709; see also Owen L. Anderson & Charles T. Edin, The Growing Uncertainty of Real Estate 
Titles, 65 N.D. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
